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Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study
Adam S. Chilton*

Abstract
Scholars have long speculated that commitments to human rights agreements are unlikely
to have an efect on domesticpolig because they do not contain a threat of external enforcement.
Recent research has challenged that belief by suggesting that ratification of human rights
agreements leads democracies to change theirpolicies because internationalcommitments change
public supportfor reform. Although considerableprogress has been made, the empiricalresearch
in support of that theog has not directly tested the primay causal mechanisms speculated to
producepoligy changes. Experimentalmethods present a promising way to do exactly that. To
leverage thatfact, I have embedded an experiment within a survey in the first effort to explore
whether information on the status of internationallaw changes public opinion on a purely
domestic human rights issue: the practice of subjecting prisoners to solitaU confinement. The
results show that, although generic appeals to human nghts do not influence public opinion,
references to prior treaty commitments do. In other words, the results demonstrate the
plausibility of theories of compliance with human rights agreements that are based on the idea
that internationalobligations alter the politicalclimate within democracies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, one of the most hotly debated questions in the study
of international law has been whether states change their policies as a
consequence of the international human rights agreements that they ratify.
Skeptics have long been critical of the idea that international agreements actually
result in changes to state behavior,2 and they especially question whether
international treaty commitments could change human rights practices.' After
all, the most straightforward explanation for why states comply with
international agreements is that other states and international institutions are
able to use a variety of mechanisms to help enforce compliance,' but human
rights treaties do not contain strong external enforcement mechanisms and
states have not taken steps to hold countries accountable for failing to live up to
prior commitments.
In response to that powerful argument, a number of scholars have begun
to propose theories of why, even in the absence of any external enforcement,
states might still change their behavior after ratifying human rights treaties.
Although a number of theories have been put forward,' the theory that has
gained the most traction is that the presence of an international obligation
changes public support for domestic efforts to bring a country's practices into
compliance with its international commitments.' Although this "domestic
politics" theory of compliance does not predict that ratifying human rights
agreements would change the human rights practices of autocracies, it does
hypothesize that it would for states that are at least partially democratic.8 In
other words, the theory is that in democracies, domestic actors are able to use
the state's prior ratification of international treaties to bring about changes in
human rights practices that would have otherwise not occurred because the
presence of an international legal obligation changes political support for reform.
Two lines of empirical scholarship have emerged that support this theory.
The first line of scholarship has used observational data to show that partially
I

Beth Simmons, Treaty Compliance and Violation, 13 ANN. REv. POL. Sci. 273, 288-92 (2010).

2

George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?,50 INT'L

3

JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

4

ERIc A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, THE EcONoMic FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-

ORG. 379, 380 (1996).

36(2013).

5

Id. at 205-6.

6

See, for example, Harold H. Koh, TransnationallgalProcess,75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 199-206 (1996).

7

BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DoMESTIC PoTcs

(2009).

8

Id. at 15-16.
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democratic states that ratify international human rights agreements may have
corresponding changes in public policy.9 Using a variety of sophisticated
statistical techniques-such as instrumental variable regressions"o and
matching" '-these studies have even suggested that changes in policy can be
caused by the treaty ratification.12 The second line of scholarship has suggested
that information on international obligations changes public opinion." The
logical implication of this line of research is that, since democratic governments
are constrained by the views of citizens, changes in "public opinion [create]
some pressure towards compliance with international law."l 4
Neither line of scholarship, however, has provided a direct test of whether
states are likely to change their human rights practices after ratifying
international agreements because of changes in domestic political support for
reform. The first line of scholarship falls short because, although ratification of
international agreements can be shown to correlate with policy changes within a
country, the studies have not been able to directly test the hypothesized causal
mechanism. That is, these studies have not included evidence that the policy
changes are a result of changes in public support for reform. The second line of
scholarship falls short because the studies that have shown that international
obligations can change public opinion have only examined international issues
where threats of external enforcement exist. Put differently, these studies have
looked at the effect of international obligations on public opinion on the
conduct of war, trade policy, or the treatment of foreign nationals-areas of
9

SIMMONS, supra note 7; Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for

Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOI.. 925 (2005).
10

SIMMONS, supra note 7.

11

13

Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial Enforcement of International
Human Rights Agreements, 67 INT'L ORG. 469 (2013) [hereinafter Lupu I]; Yonatan Lupu, The
Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the JSadalModel to Address Selection Effects, 52 AM.J. Pot.
Sci. 912 (2013) [hereinafter Lupu II]; Daniel W. Hill, Jr., Estimating the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties on State Behavior, 72 J. Pol.. 1161 (2010).
But see ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL. HUMAN RIGHTS LAw (forthcoming
2014) (arguing against evidence that ratification of human rights agreements has changed state
practice).
Stephen Chaudoin, Promises or Podes? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and
Audience Reactions, 68 INT'L ORG. 235 (2014); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Publc
Attitudes Towards Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT'L ORG. 105 (2013); Tonya L. Putnam &
Jacob N. Shapiro, International Law and Voter Preferences:The Case of Foreign Human Rights Violations
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-jns/papers/Putnam Shapiro
2013_IL.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Efect of International
Law on Preferences and Beliefs (Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.stanford.edu/-tomz/
working/Tomz-IntlLaw-2008-02-1 la.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); James D. Fearon, Domestic
PoliticalAudiencesand the Escalation ofInternationalDisputes, 88 AM. POL. SC. REV. 577 (1994).

14

POSNER & SYKEs, supra note 4, at 27.

12
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policy that can be directly influenced by the actions of other actors. As a
consequence, neither line of scholarship has produced strong evidence that
international obligations that do not include realistic threats of external
enforcement-such as ratification of human rights agreements-will result in
policy changes because of changes in public support for policy reform.
This Article attempts to directly test whether ratification of human rights
agreements increases public support for altering human rights practices. To do
so, I have conducted a randomized expeniment testing the influence of
international law on a purely domestic human rights issue: reforming the use of
solitary confinement in prisons. The experiment examined whether respondents
held different opinions as a result of being told that critics of the use of solitary
confinement argue that the United States is not living up to a human rights
agreement it is party to that regulates the practice. The results of this experiment
not only demonstrate that information on treaty membership does have a small
but statistically significant effect on public opinion, but also show that generic
appeals to human rights do not have such an impact. In other words, this Article
makes an important contribution to the literature by showing that, when a state
has previously joined a human rights agreement, political actors may have a
better chance of changing public policy than they would without the treaty
because appealing to the agreement has a substantive effect on public opinion.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Section II lays out the development of
the domestic politics theory of compliance with human rights agreements, and
discusses why experimental methods present a promising way forward to test the
theory. Section III explains the experiment that I have designed and conducted
on whether information on the status of international law changes the views of
individuals on a proposed reform to American policy. Section IV presents the
results of that experiment. Section V discusses the results and concludes.
II. THEORIES OF COMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN
RIGHTS AGREEMENTS
One of the most important and active debates in international legal
scholarship is whether states change their domestic policies as a consequence of
making international commitments to human rights.'s In this Section I outline
that debate and lay out the argument for why an experimental approach may
help to advance it. First, I briefly review both the literature on international law
that has expressed skepticism that states change their domestic policies as a
consequence of ratifying international treaties without enforcement mechanisms,
and the literature arguing that commitments to international agreements on
15

Simmons, supra note 1, at 288-92.
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human rights are likely to result in changes to state behavior by altering the
domestic politics within the country. Second, I explain that, although research
has suggested that democracies may change their policies as a result of joining
human rights agreements, these studies have not yet demonstrated why that may
be the case. Third, I outline the merits of using an experimental approach to test
the causal mechanism proposed by these domestic politics theories of
compliance.
A. Domestic Theories of Compliance
Scholars of international relations have long been skeptical of the idea that
states change their behavior as a consequence of international law." Scholars
that hold these views-commonly associated with realism-have been willing to
concede that states largely comply with their international legal obligations."
They argue, however, that this fact should not be taken as evidence that
international law changes state behavior." Instead, they contend, international
legal agreements that are made reflect existing state power relationships and state
interests at the time that the agreements are formed." As a consequence, treaties
themselves do not actually change state behavior-they serve simply as a
statement of existing realities about the state of the world. As a result, states
should be expected to comply with international agreements when it is in their
interest to do so, and disregard international commitments when they are no
longer consistent with the state's interests. 20
Scholars that are skeptical about the power of international law to change
state policies generally are especially critical of the idea that states alter their
behavior as a consequence of ratifying international human rights agreements.2 1
Although there are several reasons that motivate this view, perhaps the most
important is that states do not pay a large price for violation.2 2 Modern human
rights treaties have not included strong external enforcement mechanisms, and
16

For a good discussion of the "conventional wisdom" of the influence of international law, see
SIMMONS, supra note 7, at 114-16.

17

HANS

J.

MORGENTHAU, PouTics AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE

(Kenneth W. Thompson & W. David Clinton eds., 7th ed. 2006). For an articulation of the view
that states generally comply with international law, see Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes,
On Complance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993).
15
19

20

See Downs et al., supra note 2.
See,for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of InternationalInstitutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY
5 (1995).
For a discussion of realists that hold this view, see XINYUAN DAI, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
AND NATIONAL POICI s 16-19 (2007).

21

See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 107-34.

22

See id. at 120.
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states have largely not retaliated against foreign states simply for failing to live up
to the commitments that they have previously made in these agreements. As a
result, the common refrain is that these treaties do not serve as a meaningful
constraint on state behavior given the lack of external enforcement.23
Against this backdrop, a number of scholars have begun to develop
theories explaining how being party to international agreements might alter state
behavior despite the absence of external enforcement mechanisms.24 These
scholars have agreed with realists that international human rights agreements do
not provide a meaningful external constraint on state behavior. The argument
that has been advanced, however, is that in the context of human rights,
international treaties "empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state with
different rights preferences that were not empowered to the same extent in the
absence of the treaties."" In other words, human rights treaties change state
policies because they change the balance of power at the domestic level.
In the most extensive articulation of this theory, Beth Simmons argues that
ratifying human rights treaties can result in changes to domestic policies, without
any threat of outside enforcement.2 6 Although Simmons suggests several
potential mechanisms for how this may occur, the principal mechanism
advanced is that treaty commitments change citizens' willingness to support
changes to human rights policies. When states ratify international human rights
agreements, countries have made a public commitment to certain standards of
rights protection. When individual citizens perceive that their rights do not
correspond to that prior commitment, this has two important effects according
to Simmons.27 First, a perceived "rights gap" is created, which makes citizens
more likely to demand that their rights be respected.28 Second, the social
environment is changed by making others more sympathetic and tolerant of
such demands; this improves the likelihood that advocating for more rights will
be successful.29 The consequence is that the shift in public attitudes caused by
the ratification of the treaty makes it more likely that a country that is at least
partially democratic will alter its domestic policies in order to come into
compliance with the treaty.

24

See SIMMoNs, supra note 7, at 116 ("If we are looking for empathetic enforcement [of human
rights treaties] from other countries, we will be looking in vain for a long time.").
SIMMONS, supra note 7; DAI, supra note 20; Xinyuan Dai, Why Compy? The Domestic Constituenc

25

Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG. 363 (2005).
SIMMONS, supra note 7, at 125 (emphasis removed).

26

See SIMMONS, supra note 7.

23

27

See id. at 135.

28

Id. at 135-36.

29

Id. at 14-48.
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B.

Shortcomings of Existing Evidence

Scholars have made considerable progress testing the theory that states that
are at least partially democratic are likely to change their policies as a result of
signing human rights agreements even without external enforcement because of
changes in domestic political support for reform. In fact, there have been two
specific lines of research that have provided the domestic politics theory of
compliance empirical support. Neither line of research, however, has been able
to directly test the causal mechanism the theory proposes.
The first line of research has used observational data to empirically test
whether states have complied with the human rights agreements that they have
joined.30 Although there have been differences in the research designs used by
these studies, the basic approach has been to analyze whether the "treatment" of
joining an international human rights agreement has an impact on a dependent
variable associated with compliance. For example, studies have analyzed whether
ratification of the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) has been associated with changes in measures of women's economic,
social, and political rights; or whether ratification of the Convention Against
Torture (CAT) has been associated with changes in violations of the physical
integrity of citizens. 31
Although this line of research has produced some evidence that ratification
of human rights agreements can lead countries that are at least partially
democratic to improve their human right practices,32 the research has not tested
the mechanisms that have been hypothesized as having the potential to cause
states to change their behavior as a consequence of prior commitments. As
previously noted, Simmons and others have suggested specific mechanisms for
how ratifying international agreements could alter the domestic political
landscape in a way that results in changes in policy even in the absence of threats
30

Lupu I, supra note 11; Lupu II, supra note 11; Hill, supra note 11; SIMMONS, supra note 7;
Neumayer, supra note 9; Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Deference?, 111 YAJEi
L.J. 1935 (2002). It is worth noting that several early studies found that ratification of human
rights agreements actually has a negative effect on human rights. See, for example, Hathaway, supra.
More recent research, however, has suggested that these findings were due to selection and not
treatment effects. See Lupu II, supra note 11. Moreover, there is additionally evidence that the
effect of treaty commitments on behavior is conditional on regime type. SIMMONs, supra note 7;
Neumayer, supra note 9.

31

Lupu II, supra note 11; Hill, supra note 11; SIMMONs, supra note 7; Hathaway, supra note 30.

32

Lupu II, supra note 11; SIMMONS, supra note 7. It is important to note that studies have also
suggested that autocracies that join international human rights agreements might actually have
worse human rights practices as a consequence. See, for example, Hill, supra note 11 at 1172;
Neumayer, supra note 9; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Haman Rights in a
Globali/ng World: The Paradox of Empt Promises, 110 AM. J. Soc. 1373, 1405 (2005); Hathaway,
supra note 30.
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of external enforcement. Although these mechanisms have been explored using
qualitative analysis," scholars have not yet empirically tested these mechanisms
using quantitative data. As a result, a shortcoming of this line of research is that
it has not been able to demonstrate the specific causes of policy changes that
might have resulted from ratification of human rights agreements.
A second line of research has tested whether the presence of international
obligations change public opinion.34 The underlying premise of this research has
been that democratic governments are responsive to the views of citizens." The
clear implication of that premise is that, if international obligations do change
public opinion, democratic governments should change their policies as a
consequence of those obligations even without external pressures. Since these
studies have found evidence that information on the status of international
obligations can in fact change public opinion, they thus provide evidence in
support of the theory that democratic governments are likely to change their
human rights policies as a result of joining international agreements.
Although this line of research helps lend credibility to domestic politics
theories of compliance, it has not yet directly tested the theory. Among the
limited number of experiments that have recently been conducted to test the
influence of international law on public opinion,36 there has not yet been a single
effort to test whether ratification of human rights agreements could result in
changes to domestic policies. Instead, the experiments that have been previously
conducted have analyzed the relationship between information on the status of
international law and public opinion on international issues." For example, these
experiments have tested whether information on international law makes
individuals more supportive of torturing foreign detainees in the war on terror38
or more supportive of imposing trade sanctions on foreign countries.39 The
significance is that respondents may only change their views on the policies
studied because of the foreign policy dimensions of the subject area-such as

33

SIMMoNs, supra note 7; DAI, supra note 20.

34

Fearon supra note 13; Tomz, supra note 13; Putnam & Shapiro supra note 13; Chaudoin, supra note
13; Wallace, supra note 13.

35

POSNER & SYKES, supra note 4, at 27.
Tomz, supra note 13; Putnam & Shapiro supra note 13; Chaudoin, supra note 13; Wallace, supra
note 13.

36

37

But see Michael G. Findley et al., Using FieldExperiments in InternationalRelations: A RandomiZed Stud
of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT'L ORG. 657 (2013) (using a field experiment to test how
information on international law influences the willingness of private business to offer
anonymous incorporation).

38
39

Wallace, supra note 13.
Chaudoin, supra note 13.
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the potential for retaliation from external actors." These theories thus do not
provide a direct test of the causal mechanism suggested by the most prominent
domestic theory of compliance.
C. Designing an Experimental Test
One promising way to gain leverage on the question of whether states
change their behavior as a result of joining international human rights
agreements is to conduct an experiment. Despite the fact that experimental
methods have become increasingly used by political scientists and legal scholars
over the last decade, they have been scarcely used to study international law.4'
This is surprising given the fact that scholarship on international law has been
increasingly concerned with finding ways to test for causal relationships,4 2 but
has only slowly begun to turn towards experimental methods that randomize
treatment as a way to do so.43 An experiment has still not been conducted,
however, that directly tests domestic theories of compliance with human rights
agreements. This is a missed opportunity because experimental methods present
an excellent way to directly test the key causal mechanism theorized as a way
that ratifying international agreements changes domestic policy"-that is,
experimental methods may answer the question: does learning that their country
has joined an international agreement make citizens more supportive of
proposals to reform their governments' human rights policies on that issue area?
Of course, designing an experiment capable of answering this question
without deceiving the respondents requires finding an issue area where the
country the respondents live in is currently-at least arguably-not living up to
its obligations under an international human rights agreement. This is a difficult
task for a researcher proposing to conduct an experiment on a pool of American
respondents; although the United States may have anomalous patterns of
ratifying international agreements,45 the United States is largely compliant with
the human rights agreements that it has ratified.
One area, however, where some commentators have argued that the
United States has policies that are inconsistent with the international agreements
4

41

For example, Chaudoin tells respondents that a policy "violates trade agreements between the
United States and Europe, and Europe would sue the United States at the World Trade Organiation"
(emphasis added). Chaudoin, supra note 13, at 243.
Adam S. Chilton & Dustin H. Tingley, Why the Study of International Law Needs Experiments, 52

COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (2013).
42

Lupu II, supra note 11.

43

See,for example, Findley et al., supra note 37.

44

SIMMoNs, supra note 7, at 139.

45

Id. at 39-47.
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that it has ratified is the use of solitary confinement. Even though solitary
confinement is frequently used in American prisons,4 6 it has been argued that
this practice is inconsistent with a number of international agreements,47
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)48 and
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).49 The possibility that the United States
was violating the ICCPR by extensively using solitary confinement was even
recently raised by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.so
It should be noted, however, that the United States filed reservations to
both agreements stating that America would not recognize limitations that are
more expansive than the limits on punishments provided by the US
Constitution." It is thus controversial to claim that the frequent use of solitary
confinement by the United States constitutes a violation of America's
international agreements. That said, the use of solitary confinement is a clear
policy area where it would be reasonable to say that critics argue that the US is
currently in violation of the human rights agreements that it has ratified. As a
result, in the first experimental test of whether the prior ratification of human
rights treaties makes individuals more supportive of changes to domestic
policies, I have conducted an experiment on how information on the status of
international law changes support for the use of solitary confinement in
American prisons.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This Section describes the experiment that I have conducted to test
whether ratification of international human rights agreements changes the views
of Americans on domestic policy questions. In this Section, I first outline the
46

For background on this topic, see AMERICAN Civi. LIBERTIES UNION, Unfinished Business: Turning
the Obama Administration's Human Rights Promises into Polig (March 21, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/unfinished business aclu-final.pdf.

47

See Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of SolitaU Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Its
Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1 (2006); Elizabeth
Vasiliades, SolitaU Confinement and InternationalHuman Ri hts: Wy the U.S. Prison System Fails Global
Standards,21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 71 (2006).
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1984,1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into forceJune 26, 1987).
United Nations Human Rights Committee: Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of
the United States of America (Advance Unedited Version), pg. 8 (March 27, 2014).
For the reservation to the I.C.C.P.R., see 138 CONG. REc. 8070-71 (1992), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014); for the
reservation to the C.A.T., see 136 CONG. REC. 36,198-99 (1990), available at http://wwwl.umn
.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.htmI (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

48

49
50

51

120

Vol 15 No. 1

Chilton

Influence of IHR Agreements

motivations for the experiment. Second, I explain the survey recruitment
process. Third, I describe the experiment itself. Fourth, I discuss the diagnostics
conducted to test the reliability of the experiment before analyzing the results.
A. Motivations
The goal of this experiment is to gain insight into whether a prior
commitment to an international human rights agreement changes the views that
individuals hold on domestic policy. This experiment specifically seeks to
address three questions. First, does learning the fact that the United States has
previously joined an international human rights agreement on a topic change
respondents' views on issues of domestic policy? As previously noted, one
theorized mechanism for why democracies might change their policies after
signing human rights treaties is that such an act changes domestic public
opinion. To date, however, experimental research has not been conducted to
establish this link.
Second, how does the magnitude of the effect of information of
international law compare to similar arguments on the same topic? A claim
necessary to the argument that international commitments can result in policy
changes by altering public opinion is the corollary that information on
international law results in larger changes in public opinion than other similar
arguments that do not invoke international commitments. For example, if
arguing that executing minors violates their human rights has the same effect on
public opinion as arguing that executing minors violates human rights
agreements, then the added benefit of the agreement is less clear.52
Third, if information on international law changes public opinion, why is
that the case? Does it change minds because people would prefer not to violate
previous agreements, because they now are more likely to view the act as
immoral, or because information on the status of international law creates a gap
between the domestic policy and international standards? To answer this final
question, this experiment directly tests several previously theorized mechanisms
for how information on international law may change opinions.
B. Subject Recruitment
This experiment was administered to 1,859 respondents in April 2013. The
respondents were all recruited online using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (mTurk)
52

Of course, it would still be possible that international agreements could have what Michael Tomz
refers to as "additive effects." Tomz, supra note 13, at 19. That is, that being party to an
international agreement provides an "extra" argument that can move public opinion further than
simply using the arguments available without the agreement would. There is currently limited
evidence that additive effects for international law are robust.
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service. Through mTurk, individuals are able to offer a pool of users a small fee
to complete a short task-in this case, completing a survey." The appeal of
mTurk is that it is a very cost effective, convenient, and fast way to recruit
subjects for experimental research.54 Although it might be reasonable to think
that there is a trade-off associated with using mTurk compared with more
traditional methods of subject recruitment," a growing body of research has
suggested that mTurk produces the same results as experiments conducted
through other means." For example, Berinsky et al. have replicated experiments
that have been conducted using other methods on samples of subjects recruited
through mTurk, and their results show that the results produced by mTurk are
statistically the same as the results obtained using other pools of respondents."
Moreover, experimental research conducted using mTurk to recruit subjects has
now appeared in the most respected peer-reviewed political science journals." It
is important to note, however, that subject pools recruited through mTurk tend
to be younger and more liberal than the population as a whole." This was the
case for my sample as well, which does admittedly limit the generalizability of
the results."

53

Respondents were paid $0.50 for completing this survey.

5

See Winter Mason & Siddharth Suri, Conducting Behavioral Research on AmaZon's Mechanical Turk, 44
BEHAV. RES. METHODS 1 (2012); Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Expeiments onAma on Mechanical
Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DIncisioN MAKING 411 (2010).

ss

See Dan M. Kahan, What's a 'Valid' Sample? Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 1,
available at http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problemswith-mechanical-turk-study-sam.htmI (last visited May 12, 2014). More specifically, it may be
reasonable to think that there is a drawback to using respondents recruited using mTurk because
they are completing the experiment for a small fee, and consequently, that the results might be
biased in a number of ways (for example, the respondents might In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use
of Soitay Confinement in U.S. Prisons and Its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture be
biased because they are repeatedly taking survey experiments).
See Laura Germine et al., Is the Web as Good as the Lab? Comparable Performancefrom Web and Lab in
Cognitive/PerceptualExperiments, 19 PSYCHoNoMic BULL. REV. 847 (2012).
Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluaing Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: AmaZon.com's
Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSiS 351 (2012).
See, for example, Gregory A. Huber et al., Sources of Bias in Retspective Decision Making: Experimental
Eidence on Voters' Limitations in Controlling Incumbents, 106 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 720 (2012); Kevin
Arceneaux, Cogniive Biases and the Strength of PoliticalArguments,56 AM.J. Pot. Sa. 271 (2012).
See Dustin Tingley & Mike Tomz, ConditionalCooperationand Climate Change, 47 COMP. POL. STUD.
344 (2013).
Appendix A reports summary statistics of the subjects' demographic characteristics.
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C. The Experiment
The survey had three parts. First, the respondents were asked a series of
demographic questions about their background and political beliefs. Second, the
respondents were told of a proposed policy reform, randomly assigned into one
of three treatment groups that altered the slate of arguments that they received
in support of the change in policy, and then were asked if they approve or
disapprove of the proposed policy reform. Third, the respondents were asked a
series of questions that directly tested possible causal mechanisms for how
information on the status of international law might change their opinions.
The second part of the survey contained the experiment. For the
experiment, the respondents were told that they were going to read about a
policy currently used in American prisons that lawmakers have been considering
reforming." The survey then described the current use of solitary confinement
in American prisons. Respondents were told that prisoners are often subject to
solitary confinement for extended periods of time, and that these periods can
last for years. Respondents were further told that, while in solitary confinement,
prisoners can be held in their cell for up to twenty-three hours a day, and that
during these periods the prisoners are deprived of human contact.
Every respondent then received the same argument in support of the
continued use of solitary confinement. The respondents were specifically told
that: "Supporters of the use of solitary confinement argue that its use is
necessary to maintain prison discipline and ensure the safety of prisoners and
guards alike." After being presented with that argument, the respondents were
randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups. These treatment groups
either were not presented with additional information (the control group), or
were presented with one of two arguments against solitary confinement (the
placebo and international law groups). The specific text of the three treatments
was:
*
*

*

61

Control Treatment: (None).
Placebo Treatment: "Critics of the use of solitary confinement
argue that it should be eliminated except in the most extreme
cases because it violates the human rights of the prisoners held in
solitary confinement."
International Law Treatment: "Critics of the use of solitary
confinement argue that it should be eliminated except in the
most extreme cases because it violates international human rights
treaties that the United States has signed."

Exact wording of the experiment is in Appendix B.
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The first treatment provided a control group for the experiment. This
group was not presented with an argument against solitary confinement. The
responses of the control group thus provide a baseline that can be used to
measure how critical arguments against solitary confinement influence public
opinion.
The second treatment was a "placebo" that referred to human rights
generally. The treatment informs subjects that critics of the use of solitary
confinement contend that the practice violates human rights, but the source of
the human rights referred to in this treatment was left intentionally vague.
Respondents are free to infer that the human rights invoked are rights in a
general moral sense, or human rights that are specifically codified in domestic or
international 'laws. Additionally, the treatment does not make any arguments
about consequences that result from violating the human rights of prisoners.
The presence of this treatment helps to test the effect that a general argument
against solitary confinement has on changes in public opinion, and to invoke the
concept of human rights but without a codified international agreement behind
it.

The third treatment specifically refers to the presence of an international
human rights treaty. The intent of this treatment is to test whether international
law changes opinions on a specific policy issue as directly, and simply, as
possible. Unlike some other experiments that have tested the influence of
international law on opinions over foreign affairs treaties, this experiment did
not include any claims about what the consequences of violating international
law would be. There are two rationales for this decision. First, specifically stating
a consequence of violating international law might simply pick up changes in
opinion due to the risk of consequences that have nothing to do the prior
commitment to international law. Second, in the human rights context,
international law does not in fact have an enforcement mechanism. This is why
critics have been especially skeptical that joining human rights agreements might
change policy. As a result, the treatment simply states the fact that previously
signed agreements would be violated.62 This provides the cleanest test of
whether signing international treaties might change opinions on domestic policy
issues.

62

It is worth noting that the treatment intentionally said that the policy violates international
agreements that the United States has "signed," and not agreements that the United States has
"ratified." Of course, there is a distinction between signing and ratifying agreements, and the
United States has ratified the relevant agreements on the topic. The word choice was chosen,
however, to avoid confusing respondents by presenting an argument that sounds too technical.
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The placebo and international law treatments were intentionally designed
to be similar in as many respects as possible. They employ parallel sentence
structures, comparable tones, and the same number of words. The hope was
that, by designing the treatments in this way, it would be possible to isolate what
effect, if any, international law had on changes in public opinion.
After receiving either the control, placebo, or international law treatment,
the respondents were told that: "American lawmakers have been considering
reforms that would eliminate the use of solitary confinement except in extreme
circumstances where keeping the prisoner in the general population would pose
immediate safety risks." The respondents were then asked whether they
Approve, Disapprove, or Neither Disapprove nor Approve of the proposed
reform. Immediately after, respondents that approved were asked whether they
"strongly approved" or "somewhat approved"; respondents that disapproved
were asked whether they "strongly disapproved" or "somewhat disapproved";
and respondents that indicated neither preference were asked whether they "lean
towards approving" or "lean towards disapproving." The result was that
respondents offered their opinion along a six-point scale."
D. Survey Balance and Receipt of Treatment
Before analyzing the results, conducted two tests of the reliability of the
results. The first test is an analysis to ensure that the treatment assignment was
not skewed among respondents based on their demographic characteristics. To
test this, I regressed a dummy variable for each of the three treatments on six
demographic factors recorded for each respondent. 4 Specifically, I regressed the
treatment received on the respondents' age, gender, education level, political
party, citizenship, and race." In that analysis, not a single demographic variable
was a statistically significant predictor of being assigned to a particular group.
Based on these regressions, we thus cannot reject the null hypothesis that
treatment assignment is balanced across all three treatment groups.
As an additional test of the reliability of the experiment, I included a
question at the end of the survey to test whether respondents had actually
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This approach follows Chaudoin, supra note 13. Previous experimental research on the effect of
international law on public opinion had used a seven-point scale; the difference being that
respondents could say they neither leaned towards agreeing or disagreeing. See Wallace, supra note
13; Tomz, supra note 13. The downside of doing so, however, is that many responses have to be
discarded for analysis because the respondent did not choose between whether he or she
approved or disapproved.

6

This approach is following Chaudoin, supra note 13.
Appendix C reports the results of this analysis.
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received the desired treatment.66 First, respondents were presented with two
arguments in support of the continued use of solitary confinement and asked to
correctly identify which one they had received initially.67 Respondents were able
to correctly identify the argument in support that they received at a 98 percent
rate. Second, all respondents were asked whether they were told that critics of
the use of solitary confinement have argued that it "violates the rights of
prisoners," "violates international treaties the United States has signed," or
"neither." The wording of the options presented were intentionally slightly
different than the wording used when the treatments were presented to serve as
a test of whether respondents actually processed the argument they were given.
Despite that fact, over 50 percent of respondents could correctly identify the
treatment they received. For both of these questions, I can easily reject the null
hypotheses that respondents randomly guessed at which arguments they had
been told at the 0.001 level."
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the results of my experiment.69 First, I discuss the
results of the primary experimental manipulation embedded in the survey.
Second, I analyze the influence that political ideology had on the results. Third, I
present the results of the mechanism questions asked during the third part of the
survey.
A. Primary Results
The primary results from the experiment are presented in Figure 1. The
first treatment group shown in the graph is the control group; that is, the
respondents who did not receive an argument in favor of solitary confinement

66

This test also follows the approach used by Chaudoin, supra note 13 at 245.

67

Respondents were asked whether they were told the argument they actually received or whether
solitary confinement should continue to be used because the prisoners that receive the
punishment deserve it.
For both questions, this is based on using t-tests. For the first question, since there were two
possible responses, respondents would be expected to randomly guess the correct answer 50
percent of the time. The t-test was thus used to test whether the proportion of correct responses
was statistically different than 0.5. For the second question, since there were three possible
responses, the t-test was used to test whether the proportion of correct responses was statistically
different than 0.33.
Given the random assignment of treatment and the balance among the treatment groups, this
section simply reports the difference in mean responses for the treatment groups. Appendix D,
however, reports the results of an ordered logit model estimating the effects of the treatments
while controlling for demographic characteristics. The results of that analysis are consistent with
the results reported in body of the paper.
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reform. On a scale from 1 to 6-with 1 strongly disagreeing with solitary
confinement reform and 6 strongly agreeing with it-the control group's average
response was 4.13 (90% CI: 4.01, 4.25). The second treatment group shown in
the graph received the placebo treatment. Specifically, they were told that
solitary confinement violates the human rights of prisoners. These respondents
had a near identical response to the control group-their average response was
also 4.13 (90% CI: 4.02, 4.25). The final treatment group shown in the graph is
the one of primary interest for this experiment-the respondents who were told
solitary confinement violated human rights treaties the United States has signed.
This group had an average response of 4.34 (90% CI: 4.23, 4.46).
FIGURE 1: TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR OVERALL SAMPLE
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There are several interesting things about these results. First, the overall
level of support for solitary confinement reform is generally high. For example,
without receiving an argument in favor of doing so, 66 percent of respondents
in the control group expressed approval for reform." Second, the placebo
treatment did not move the needle at all. Being told that solitary confinement
"violates the human rights of the prisoners" had no effect on support for
reform. This is surprising because it would be reasonable to think that any
70

This is the percentage of respondents that leaned towards agreeing with reform, somewhat
agreed, or strongly agreed.
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argument against solitary confinement would increase support for reform
compared to the control group. A generic appeal to human rights, however, did
not have that effect. Third, being told that critics argue that the widespread use
of solitary confinement "violates international human rights treaties that the
United States has signed" had a modest but statistically significant effect on
public opinion. This information increased support for reforming the practice
over both the control group (p-value = 0.03) and the placebo group (p-value =
0.03)." Although the effect was small in magnitude, this is still compelling
evidence for the proposition that ratification of international human rights
treaties has at least the potential to result in changes in public policy, because
information on ratification resulted in a statistically significant change in opinion
over a near identically worded treatment that did not mention international
agreements.
B. Results by Partisan Identification
FIGURE 2: TREATMENT EFFECTS BY PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION
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This translates into roughly a 4 percent increase in support for reform. This is roughly consistent
with the 6 percent change that Wallace found in his study. Wallace, supra note 13.
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Of course, it is possible that this treatment effect is not consistent across
ideology. As was previously noted, subjects recruited through mTurk skew
younger and more liberal than the overall population, and there is evidence that
suggests that reactions to international law vary based on political ideology.7 2 To
investigate this further, I subset the sample into two groups: respondents who
self-identified as Democrats (or Democratic leaning) and Republicans (or
Republican leaning)." The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 2.
As Figure 2 shows, the pattern for both Democrats and Republicans is
roughly the same. Democrats are slightly more supportive of solitary
confinement reform than the overall population. Democrats in the control
treatment group supported solitary confinement reform at a 4.45 rate.
Information on international law increased support by 0.17 to 4.62, but this
increase falls short of conventional levels of significance (p-value = 0.16).
Republicans, on the other hand, were less supportive of solitary confinement
reform overall-the control treatment group averaged 3.31. Information on
international law, however, increased approval to 3.74. This was an increase of
0.43, which was both substantively and statistically significant (p-value = 0.05).
This suggests that information on the status of international law on domestic
human rights practices, at least with respect to solitary confinement, actually has
a greater effect on Republicans than on Democrats. This result is perhaps
surprising given the fact that previous research has suggested that Republicans'
opinions are less affected by information on international law.74 Moreover,
although the larger treatment effect for Republicans compared to Democrats
may be specific to this topic or simply be driven due to ceiling effects, it is
significant nonetheless because it suggests that the overall treatment effect found
in this study would be even larger if the sample were more representative and
contained a greater proportion of conservatives.
C. Mediation Analysis
As the results presented so far have shown, information on the fact that
the United States was party to a human rights treaty has a statistically significant
impact on support for reforming solitary confinement practices. This raises the
question of why that might be the case. One advantage of experimental methods
is that they make it possible not only to directly test whether hypothesized
treatment effects exist, but also to directly test causal pathways. This can be
done if the experiment measures both the effect of a particular treatment on an
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Tingley & Tomz, supra note 59.
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Independents who did not indicate a leaning were excluded.

74

Wallace, supra note 13.
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outcome of interest, and the changes caused by the treatment that would affect
the outcome. For example, the treatment of providing people with information
on international law may change respondents' support for solitary confinement
reform either because it makes them believe that the punishment is immoral or
because the punishment breaks an important commitment.
To take advantage of that fact, after respondents completed the main
experiment, I asked their opinion on three questions designed to test what
considerations may be mediating any treatment effect caused by information on
international law." The order these questions were presented was randomized to
avoid the possibility of any ordering effects. Those questions were specifically
designed to test the following possible mediators:
*

Commitment: One hypothesis that has been previously put
forward to explain why international law might change opinions
is that people find it important to honor commitments." To test
this possibility, I asked respondents how important they believed
it was for the United States to honor the international treaties
that it has previously signed.
* Morality: Another possibility is that information on the status of
international law increased the likelihood that individuals will
view a particular action as immoral. This idea is simply that
individuals' views on the acceptability of a given practice will
change once they think that others have labeled it unacceptable.
To test this possibility, I asked respondents whether they viewed
subjecting prisoners to solitary confinement as immoral.
* International Standards: One hypothesis, specifically put
forward by Simmons, is that information on prior ratification of
human rights treaties creates an expectation gap." That is,
finding out that the government has made a pledge to honor a
right internationally, but that it is not actually providing that right
domestically, makes respondents crave that right more. In an
attempt to test this possibility, I simply asked whether
respondents believe that the United States' treatment of
prisoners should conform to international standards.
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Exact wording of these questions is in Appendix B.
See Tomz, suipra note 13.

n

SIMMONS, supra note 7, at 136.

75

130

Vol. 15 No. 1

Chilton

Influence ofl1HR Agreements

Using mediation analysis methods developed by Imai et al., it is possible to
8
directly test whether a treatment effect is due to a hypothesized mediator.1 The
basic intuition of these methods is that they use a two-stage process: first, they
estimate the impact of the treatment on a potential mediator; and second, they
estimate the effect of the treatment and mediator on the dependent variable of
interest (in this case, support for solitary confinement reform). In other words,
using this process, it is possible to test the extent to which information on
international law changed public opinion as a consequence of changing
respondents' views on one of these three mechanism questions.
FIGURE

3: MEDIATION EFFECTS OF CAUSAL MECHANISMS
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Kosuke Imai et al., Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from
Experiments and ObservafionalStudies, 105 AM. Pot. Sc. REv. 765 (2011).
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To use this method, I first subset the data to include only respondents that
received the control treatment or the international law treatment. I then used the
"mediate" software designed by Imai et al. to test the three causal mechanisms
previously discussed." The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 3. For
each of the three possible causal mechanisms, the figure shows the estimated
influence of the treatment that is conducted through the hypothesized
mechanism (the "Average Causal Mediation Effect" (ACME)), the direct impact
of the treatment itself (the "Direct Effect"), and the overall effect of these two
effects (the "Total Effect").
As Figure 3 shows, the first two hypothesized mediators did not have a
statistically significant impact on the influence of international law to changes in
public opinion. This suggests that information on international law did not have
a treatment effect because of the respondents' views on the importance of
commitment or the morality of the practice. The third mechanism, however, did
have an effect. The international law treatment mediated through the
international standards mechanism had a 0.1 effect on the overall outcome. This
result is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The overall treatment effect for
the international standards mechanism is 0.21, which is also significant at the
0.05 level. This result suggests that at least part of the reason that information
on international law changes public opinions on domestic policies is by changing
attitudes about what the international standard of human rights practices is in a
given issue area. In other words, being told that the use of solitary confinement
violated international law made respondents believe that the US practice was not
consistent with international human rights standards, which made those
respondents more likely to support reform to the current human rights practices.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
One of the most important questions in international law is whether
ratification of international human rights treaties can actually cause countries to
change their human rights practices. Recently, research has suggested that
ratification of these agreements may have a causal impact on the human rights
practices of states that are at least partially democratic." As this paper has
argued, however, previous studies have not directly tested exactly why ratification
might alter human rights practices in democratic states.
This paper is an effort to start answering that question. The results of this
survey show that information on prior treaty commitment has a statistically
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I specifically used the "mediate" package for R.

so

See

SIMMONS,

supra note 7. But see POSNER, stpra note 12 (raising concerns with Simmons's

results).
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significant impact on public opinion. Moreover, this study also showed that it is
not the case that any arguments would have this same impact on opinion-a
nearly identically worded treatment that appealed to human rights without
mentioning treaty ratification did not sway opinions at all. This suggests that
joining human rights treaties can change public support for reforms, which in
turn improves the political climate for activists and politicians that hope to push
policy changes consistent with those prior commitments. In other words,
commitment to human rights treaties may help pave the way for later policy
reforms.
Of course, these results should be viewed in context. First, this survey only
tested how information about how the presence of a human rights treaty
changed public opinion in one substantive issue area-solitary confinement
reform. It is thus obviously possible that information on prior treaty
commitments might have smaller or larger treatment effects in other issue areas.
Second, it is possible that the treatment effects of this experiment are biased
because international legal commitments may have already influenced the
opinions of the experimental subjects. For example, even if the subjects were
not directly aware of international legal commitments, those commitments may
have changed societal attitudes more broadly, which thus could influence the
results of this experiment. Third, America might not be a typical case. Other
countries might have divergent changes in public opinion as a consequence of
joining human rights agreements. For example, Simmons has suggested that
commitment to human rights treaties has the largest impact in states that are
transitioning democracies (and not stable democracies like the United States)."
This might suggest that the treatment effects found in this experiment could
actually be larger if the experiment were conducted on a sample of respondents
from a country that is transitioning to democracy. Fourth, recruiting the sample
through mTurk may bias the results, and other experiments should be
conducted on samples conducted through other methods. Finally, it is important
to note that modest changes in public opinion do not automatically result in
changes in public policy. This study has not demonstrated the entire causal chain
between commitment to human rights treaties and improved human rights
practices; it instead has simply tested one link in that chain.
With those caveats in mind, this study still makes an important
contribution. If information on human rights treaties can change public opinion
where generic appeals to human rights cannot, the trend of increased legalization
of human rights over the last sixty years may have done more to improve human
rights practices than many scholars have given it credit for. This is not because
joining human rights treaties is a panacea that automatically results in improved
8

SIMMONS, supra note 7, at 152-53.
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human rights practices; it is instead because treaty commitments help to improve
the baseline political support for activists and politicians striving to change
public policies. In other words, commitment to human rights treaties might
matter-but only if that commitment is used as a tool in a broader mobilization
effort for change.

APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF SUBJECTS' DEMOGRAPHIC
CHARACTERISTICS
Mean

SD

Min

Max

Male

0.55

0.50

0

1

Age

32.71

18

College Educated

0.45

11.69
0.50

0

76
1

Republican

0.28

0.45

0

1

US Citizen

0.98

0.13

0

1

White

0.76

0.43

0

1

Black

0.06

0.24

0

1

Asian

0.10

0.29

0

1

Hispanic

0.06

0.23

0

1

Other

0.03

0.16

0

1
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APPENDIX B: WORDING OF THE EXPERIMENT
Vignette
"The United States often subjects prisoners to solitary confinement for
extended periods of time. These periods can last years. When in solitary
confinement, prisoners are held in their cell for up to twenty-three hours a day
and are deprived of human contact."
"Supporters of the use of solitary confinement argue that its use is
necessary to maintain prison discipline and ensure the safety of prisoners and
guards alike."
[Treatment]
"American lawmakers have been considering reforms that would eliminate
the use of solitary confinement except in extreme circumstances where keeping
the prisoner in the general population would pose immediate safety risks."
"Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of these
reforms?"
Treatments
Control Treatment: (nothing)
1.
Placebo Treatment: "Critics of the use of solitary confinement argue that
2.
it should be eliminated except in the most extreme cases because it violates the
human rights of the prisoners held in solitary confinement."
International Law Treatment: "Critics of the use of solitary confinement
3.
argue that it should be eliminated except in the most extreme cases because it
violates international human rights treaties that the United States has signed."
Mechanism Questions
Commitment: "The United States often makes international commitments with
other countries and the international community by signing treaties. Do you
believe that the United States should change its domestic policies to honor
international legal commitments?"
Morality: "Is the use of solitary confinement immoral?"
International Standards: "Should the United States' treatment of prisoners
conform to international standard?"
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APPENDIX C: LOGIT REGRESSIONS ESTIMATING
TREATMENT PROBABILITY

Male
Age
College Educated
Republican
US Citizen
White
Black
Hispanic
Other Race

Control
Treatment
0.01
(0.11)
0.00
(0.00)
0.10
(0.11)
0.00
(0.12)
0.60
(0.42)
0.02
(0.19)
0.21
(0.28)
0.03
(0.30)
-0.47
(0.44)

Placebo
Treatment
-0.03
(0.11)
0.00

Int'1 Law
Treatment
0.03
(0.11)
0.00

(0.00)
0.02
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.12)
-0.10
(0.44)
-0.04
(0.19)
-0.07
(0.28)
0.04
(0.29)
-0.07
(0.40)

(0.00)
-0.12
(0.11)
0.08
(0.12)
-0.61
(0.51)
0.02
(0.19)
-0.14
(0.29)
-0.07
(0.30)
0.47
(0.39)

1,535

1,535

1,535

Obse rvations
-

* significant at p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001; *** p < 0.001.

-

Standard errors are in parentheses.

-

Intercept not reported.
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APPENDIX D: ORDERED LOGIT REGRESSIONS RESULTS

Placebo Treatment
International Law Treatment
Male
Age

(0.00)
0.01
(0.09)
-1.04***
(0.11)
0.73
(0.39)
0.34*
(0.16)
0.10
(0.24)
0.01
(0.24)
1.01**
(0.35)

College Educated
Republican
US Citizen
White
Black
Hispanic
Other Race

1,535

Observations

Summer 2014

Model 1
-0.01
(0.11)
0.26*
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.09)
-0.01*

-

* significant at p < 0.05; ** p < 0.001; *** p < 0.001.

-

Standard errors are in parentheses.

-

Cut-points not reported.
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